The purpose of this essay is to describe and analyse the historiography of law and the economy in Europe in the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. Three major themes or approaches can be identified within this intellectual history. The first is a sociological interest in the nature and evolution of modernity in society. Here the contested concept of 'modernity' is used to mean the emergence of a society and culture where personal identities and social practices and norms are no longer determined primarily by communal tradition but are to some degree chosen. The second approach is political, and centres on the emergence of the state as a chief framework for national and communal life, replacing local, religious, and kinship institutions. The third approach is economistic, and searches for the legal, governmental, and institutional factors that revolutionized the productive capacity of the economy and led to European domination of the world by 1900.
Today there are two narrowing tendencies at work in legal and economic historiography. One is the separation of national schools; and the other is the rise to domination of the economistic approach. 2 The next two parts of this essay will examine the intellectual lineage of today's dominant economistic model, and will criticize its usefulness for structuring enquiry into legal and economic history. The balance of the paper will investigate alternative historical models of legal and economic change, and the emergence of the national schools.
II
Lawyers and economists today are typically concerned with the evolution of rule certainty in social and political organization. In the lawyer's view, certainty of rights and obligations allows individuals to plan their actions with legal security under the rule of law. For the economist, stable yet adaptive legal rules are a necessary institutional support for rational calculation in market or other economic activity. Rule certainty promotes the calculability of legal and economic risk which is taken to be a precondition for economic growth, comprising the division and specialization of labour, intensification of trade, capital accumulation and investment, and the application of technology to production. None of these economic processes, the rule certainty model posits, can occur without sophisticated law; moreover the causation works the other way, with economic development demanding and driving the elaboration of the legal system. 3 The rule certainty model implies a commitment to the public-private divide, whereby the state provides effective ground rules for individuals to exercise their wills or pursue their purposes. The normative dimension of the model is thus to maximize individual freedom and enhance utility returns to individual activity. Two leading theorists in the cultivation of the rule certainty model are Max Weber (1864 Weber ( -1920 and Ronald Coase (born 1910). Weber's theoretical work dates from 1900, and much was left incomplete to be published after his death. 4 Coase's chief innovations were 2 For an analysis of the links between legal and economic history and theory in the later twentieth century, see R. Harris, 'The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History', (2003) 21 Law and History Review, 297.
3 See e.g. Douglass North's influential work on theoretical economic history: D. C. North and R. P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge, 1973) ; D. C. North and B. Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', (1989) 49 Journal of Economic History 803; D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990) . Similar messages are projected in Law and Economics: R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th edn., Aspen, 1998) ; and in New Institutional Economics: T. Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, 1990) . 4 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 3 vols. (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tü bingen, 1921-2; G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), New York, 1968 , Berkeley, 1978 , I, 311-38; II, 641-900. Extracts from this work are provided in three done between the 1930s and 1960s. 5 Both Weber and Coase argued that legal rules and institutions in mature economies first define entitlements, and then provide effective, impersonal procedures allowing trade and protection of those entitlements. Weber, the German sociologist of economics, religion, and law, and Coase, the Anglo-American micro-economist of transactions and institutions, thus offer a similar theory of the legal conditions for economic progress. 6 For all their resemblance, Weber's and Coase's theories of legal certainty each drew upon divergent models of law and society. Weber was a product of the German traditions of historical legal science and Kantian idealism, whilst Coase worked within the English utilitarian stream of political economy. The two theorists also pursued radically different intellectual styles. Weber as a general sociologist and economic historian offers grand theory of an ambition comparable to Marx; whilst Coase worked within the constrained utilitarian framework of analytical economics.
Weber's celebrated theory of authority underpins his sociology of law. Weber's schema distinguishes between traditional, charismatic, and rational power; power can be coercive domination or legitimate authority; traditional power can be patriarchal, patrimonial, or feudal; charisma tends to be short-lived and revolutionary, and tied to unique personalities; rational authority is legal or bureaucratic, and tends to be stable, perhaps too stable. These are not successive evolutionary stages in the manner of Marx or Maine, but rather ideal types that intersect and mix in real life. Weber's typologies of authority and governance drew from the transhistorical experience of European and non-European societies, but in intent they were not to be read as descriptions of discrete stages of history of any specific society. The ideal type was a sociological construct to improve conceptual clarity and suggest lines for research; it was not to be seen as an empirical average or even as an empirical observation, though it might draw on historical material in its formulation. 7 In studying the emergence of legalism in European cultures, Weber further distinguished between formal-rational, formal-irrational, useful volumes: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and ed.), London, 1948 London, , new edn., 1998 ; Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (E. Shils and M. Rheinstein (trans.), Cambridge, Mass., 1954) ; Max Weber: Selections in Translation (E. Matthews (trans.), W. G. Runciman (ed.) , Cambridge, 1978) . 5 R. H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', (1937) 4 Economica 386; R. H. Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost', (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. Most of Coase's important writings are collected in two volumes: The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago, 1988) ; Essays on Economics and Economists (Chicago, 1994) . For an acute overview see R. A. Posner, 'Ronald Coase and Methodology', in Overcoming Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995), 406. 6 It is fair to note that Jeremy Bentham trailed many of these ideas more than a century before: J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation: Principles of the Civil Code (R. Hildreth (ed.), London, 2nd edn., London, 1891), 111-112, and generally 109-198. 7 Max Weber: Selections, n. 4 above, 23-4. substantive-rational, and substantive-irrational law. Kronman has demonstrated that this series of four ideal types is better presented in terms of three dichotomies: those legal systems which have general rules rather than specific responses to facts; those systems that apply logical meaning and abstract norms to decisions rather than pragmatic or result-oriented tests; and those systems that separate law and morals as opposed to those that see law as a moralistic. 8 These antinomies can be seen as Weber's reworking of the ethos of the German school of classical Roman law (Pandectism) as exemplified in the work of Friedrich Puchta and Bernhard Windscheid (1829 Windscheid ( -1907 , for it was the dual German tradition of historical legal science and conceptual jurisprudence that provided the intellectual seedbed of Weber's own legal theorizing. Weber's legal theory can without exaggeration be described as a sociological paraphrase of German Pandectist literature. 9 Yet Weber went a good deal further in his theory-building, else he would not have had such strong influence on later scholarship. Weber also stressed the tendency of formal legal rationality and impersonal bureaucratic justice to develop into an ideology and serve to accrue dominating power to its own functionaries. Formal law will tend to favour the powerful and energetic classes of society who can exploit the formal equality of the law as they wield their substantive social power through property and contract. Weber further suggests that legal rational governance tends to entrap all participants in modern capitalistic society within narrowing and heartlessly functional roles. 10 This critical and pessimistic side of Weber, drawing from Marx and Nietszche, has had a profound impact on contemporary legal scholarship: 'How does formal law favour the powerful and reinforce legitimation of their power?' and 'How does individualism inflict alienation?' have become leitmotifs of legal realism and critical legal scholarship.
11 'How rational or irrational, formal or substantive, is the adminis-8 A. Kronman, Max Weber (London, 1983) , 37-95; B. S. Turner, For Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Fate (London, 1987) ; D. M. Trubeck, 'Reconstructing Max Weber's Sociology of Law', (1985) Law', in G. Sawer (ed.) , Studies in the Sociology of Law (Canberra, 1961) , 31-56. 9 Weber, Economy and Society, n. 4 above, II, 753-808, 839-900. 10 The most familiar of Weber's phrases is his arresting metaphor of the 'care for external goods' becoming for modern man an 'iron cage' ('stahlhartes'): The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (T. Parson (trans.), London, 1930 London, , repr. 1985 1st edn., 1904-5) , at 181-2. This obscure phrase is perhaps overly quoted and paraphrased; more telling is the Goethe quotation set immediately afterwards (ibid., 182): 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. [I]t by no means follows that an approach developed to explain behaviour in the economic system will be equally successful in the other social sciences. In these different fields, the purposes which men seek to achieve will not be the same and, in particular, the institutional framework (how, for example, the political and legal systems actually operate) will require specialized knowledge . . . [of] the important specific interrelationships of that system.
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Arguments against 'economic imperialism' as practised by Becker, Posner, and their followers can be normative, for example claiming that it is morally or aesthetically bad to view the entire social world through the lens of utility maximization. Or criticism can be positive, challenging the descriptive truth or accuracy or coherence or predictive power of the economic model of self-interested individuals maximizing utility through trades of entitlements.
17 It may further be argued that social science can develop richer models than price theory which give a better account of the causal relationships within non-market institutions such as law and the family.
18
But these criticisms, which Coase himself partly shares, have only been heeded at the margins. The basic Coasean model of implicit trading of entitlements in the shadow of transaction costs has now escaped from its creator's control, and has generated large and active schools of scholarship in economics, economic history, sociology and political science, to say nothing of its pervasive influence in the American legal academy.
The dissemination and impact of both Weberian and Coasean ideas within modern law, economics, history, and other social sciences suggests that those ideas met a deep-seated need for useful models of social and economic ordering in Western societies. Weber and Coase's theories each offered a programmatic methodology for research and created analytical languages which seemed to invest empirical materials with enormous significance. 
III
There are dangers as well as strengths in harnessing Weberian and Coasean theory to guide enquiry into legal and economic history. First, Weberian legal sociology and Coasean law and economics are each relatively indifferent to the internal discourse of lawyers. Coase himself gave considerable attention to the details of law, but he handles legal materials rather in the economists' manner, as stylized fact rather than historical evidence, and this can lead to vitiating errors. 19 The same applies to Coase's followers; for one leading example, the economic historian Douglass North (born 1920) makes many claims about law in his theories of the rise of the western economies but his research tends to rely on simplistic and outdated legal histories to provide empirical material for model-building.
20
Only very recently have legal scholars in the Coasean tradition begun to study law carefully from the internal point of view.
21
By contrast, Weber's engagement with legal discourse was more intensive. He wrote his doctorate in legal history concerning the forms and liabilities of south European medieval trading associations; his Habilitation was a study of Roman agrarian development and its impact on Roman public and private law; and his first work as a professor was an analysis of land tenures and labour in Prussia.
22 His career as a major legal and economic historian may possibly have been diverted by the breakdown he endured in his thirties; but Weber maintained his abiding interest in Roman law, medieval commercial law and English common law in his later work. His sociology of law emphasizes the virtues of the formal rationality of Roman law, but acknowledges that merchants could reach 19 A. W. B. Simpson, 'Coase v. Pigou Reexamined', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies, 53, with 'Addendum', at 99; R. H. Coase, 'Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson', (1996) far better practical results with their local or customary law. For Weber 'it was not . . . the greater appropriateness of the content of Roman law to the needs of emerging capitalism . . . all the specific legal institutions of modern capitalism are in fact alien to Roman Law and are of medieval origin'. He observed that the rational legal science of Pandectism drew its commercial sources from Germanic mercantile law and canon law as well as Roman law; examples were annuity bonds, bearer securities, bills of exchange, modern companies and shares, capital mortgages, trusts, and agency.
23
Hence it was not the ideas of Roman law per se that were essential ingredients of modern capitalism, but rather the emergence of legal professionalism and the methodology of modern law. Weber's theory of rational law was challenged by the 'problem' of England. He observed that English justice was formal in the royal courts but typically formless and discretionary in local courts, where the poor were governed by their rulers and denied full access to impersonal royal justice. Weber struggled with the irrationality of English legal learning and process but decided that despite the archaic qualities of English legal thought, the court procedures provided sufficient commercial certainty and in any case were attuned to the interests of the propertied and commercial classes. 24 Even English equity could be regarded as formal justice:
'aequm et bonum' in Roman Law and the original sense of 'equity' in English law. . . both are products in part of a system of justice which is already highly rationalised and in part of the abstract concepts of Natural Law: the phrase 'ex fida bona' contains in any case an allusion to good commercial 'morality' and so has as little to do with genuinely irrational justice as does our own 'free judicial opinion'.
Weber further argued that the requirement of the state to organize a standing military force explained much of the modern drive to bureaucratization and increased technical capacities of the state apparatus, processes which required a more elaborate and rationalized legal system which in the Continent took the form of Romanized law. England was peculiar in not needing a large standing army, instead developing a small but effective state apparatus capable of running its large overseas empire. Weber was a sensitive enough legal historian to concede when the evidence did not fit his ideal types or models. This ill-fit between model and material cut against Weber's own methodological commitment to Verstehendesoziologie, or understanding social action in terms of the selfunderstanding of individual motivation and experience. 26 Weber himself constantly referred to historical material to qualify his ideal types of legal governance; thus he acknowledged that so-called irrational 'Kadi-justice . . . as an actual historical phenomenon . . . were bound up with sacred traditions and their often extremely formalistic interpretation', with 'rule-free evaluations of the individual case . . . only where these sources of knowledge had failed'. He also noted the irrationality of jury decision-making, a factor challenging the formal rationality of Western law. 27 It was only possible to rescue the theoretical project, namely the description of legal rationality as a component of economic modernity, from empirical ruin by creating supplementary models, lemmas to the general theory that protected the core axioms from negation. 28 What is striking is how Weber's legal sociology of ideal types and social actions could not capture the crucial historical issue of timing or sequential causation, or as social scientists now put it, of path dependence. 29 Hence it was that the Reception of the learned laws shaped the fledging French and German secular national laws in the late middle ages, but could only partially infiltrate the English common law, already well-established by the late twelfth century.
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Weber's sociological sampling and modelling of the data of legal history thus yielded an incomplete analysis and even posed the wrong questions so far as legal historians are concerned. Oxford, 1961), chs. 7, 8. 28 Compare Thomas Kuhn's celebrated 'paradigm' model of knowledge accretion, whereby 'normal science' absorbs evidential contradictions with supplementary theory until the scientific community no longer believes in the sense or utility of the paradigm-though Kuhn himself doubted the possibilities of paradigm modelling of normative social sciences and humanities: T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd edn., Chicago, 1996) ; T. S. Kuhn, The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970 (Chicago, 2000 My second observation is that, looking at influence in the reverse direction, the theoretical ideas of Weber and Coase have only marginally informed or influenced mainstream legal history, especially in Britain. Legal historians are not obviously interested in seeking explanatory models drawn from social-scientific theory from outside the law. Their models tend to be informal, tacit, inductive, generated from positive legalistic materials, and striving above all to reconstruct the intellectual processes of past legal communities. Thus Brian Simpson described his doctrinal history of medieval and early modern contract law as 'a special branch of the history of ideas, of their reception, evolution and interaction' and added: 'I have avoided explicit discussion of general theories of legal history, especially of the type favoured by legal sociologists; the omission is deliberate. Such theories are of scant value unless based on regular historical investigation and attention to evidence'. 32 One of the reasons why Frederic William Maitland (1850 Maitland ( -1906 ) is regarded, a century later, as the greatest of all English legal historians-as well as a leading intellectual historian and medievalist-is because of his skills of historical reconstruction through imaginative entry into the evidence. 33 This informal hermeneutical approach, whether pursued self-consciously or not, may be an expression of English empiricism and scepticism, values which have been aggressively defended by scholars as different as Edward Thompson 34 and Geoffrey Elton 35 -both general historians with a strong interest in the details of law. When historians of law seek explicit theory, Marxism and antiMarxism have been far more potent spurs to scholarship than Weberian sociology or Coasean economics, especially in studies of property, crime, and criminal justice. 36 A third reason why Weber and Coase are problematic sources of theory for legal history is that their models of law are static, in the sense that the significant features of human behaviour that they isolate are ideal types that are not necessarily influenced by change over time. For example, Weber's legal-rational calculation within a system of legitimation of rational authority can be observed to coexist and overlap in historical time with traditional and charismatic authority, but there is no explanatory mechanism to explain how different forms causally relate over time. This ahistorical quality was chosen by design in Weber's methodology: if the abstract concepts of sociology were lacking in content as compared to the 'concrete realities of history', there were hoped-for gains in interpretation and meaning. 37 The Coasean transaction cost model may give point to historical analysis of how particular institutions come into being that align or disalign individual and collective economic interests, 38 but again there is no dimension of change over time in the model itself. Indeed the transaction costs theory as formulated by Coase's followers (but not by Coase himself) may reduce to empty tautology, as any state of the world can be described as 'optimal' in light of given 'transaction costs'. In other words the explanations are predicated upon some exogenous set of relationships or processes that typically are left out of the explanation. All of this is to say that the gains for historians in applying social science theory to legal and economic change are dependent on the quality of the model, and this is what is in issue.
To criticize specific theories need not imply that we can do better with no theories at all. 39 One possible path is to revisit the powerful historical traditions integrating law, economics, and sociology, that flowered at the end of the nineteenth century and the early to mid-twentieth century. The prime concern of this broad movement was to study how social, economic, and legal organization has moved through causally-related stages. 
Engels);
42 from community to society (Tö nnies), 43 from mechanical to organic solidarity (Durkheim), 44 from gift relationships to bargain and contract (Mauss) . 45 We will see how it is possible to marry these broad models of social and economic structure and change in European society to leading themes of legal history concerning the development and interrelationships of Roman law, Germanic law, and Anglo-Norman common law, and the path of state formation and economic development within the different national systems.
Evolutionary models of historical change may themselves be criticized as a highly abstracted description of modern European or Western societies. Explaining the special development and dominance of the West (including the special nature of Western law) had been a preoccupation of social thinkers from the Enlightenment onwards; and there was a tendency to describe certain products or features of European social organization (such as rule of law, property rights, limited governments and so on) as the key factors in human history. If historical progress, as led by the productive and legalistic West, was a common assumption at the end of the nineteenth century, then so was an interest in comparative social science, whereby the progress of different societies along the path of modernity could be measured against the progress of the West. 46 This is a Whiggish theory of history blown to huge, even global scale.
If the superiority of Western law and organization and the telos of progress are leitmotifs of our period, this does not mean that there was a single orthodox model. Academic specialization leading to distinctions between law, anthropology, history, sociology, and economics may have been less strong at this time, but this is not to say that students of European institutions all practised a unified social science and shared the same preoccupations. We can discern sharp differences in the conceptualization of law by scholars in different national communities, with varying cultural and political preoccupations. To advance the argument that legal and social sciences were shaped by their historical and national context, it is appropriate to investigate the praxis of legal and economic history and sociology in terms of national schools dating from the middle to the end of the nineteenth century, and thus to contextualize such scholarship within the intellectual and political life of each nation. Two broad questions may be asked. First, how did jurists and other social theorists in different national communities-Germans, English, French, and Russians-conceive the evolution to modernity, as seen through the prism of the law? And secondly, did European scholars perceive England to be a special case as the pioneer modernizer? Attention will be directed largely to intellectuals outside the pantheon of Marx, Maine, Tö nnies, and Durkheim, whose theories of legal evolution have been well-explored in recent years. German scholarship, and its English variant reaching its peak in the work of Maitland, merits special attention as the most developed legal and social science of its time and as the backdrop to Weber's work.
IV
James Whitman argued in 1990 that German lawyers had passed through two broad stages in their thinking about the relations of law (that is, mainly private law) and society. 47 In the first stage, in the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century lawyers, such as Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861), Anton Friedrich Thibaut (1772-1840), and Puchta imagined a unified and modernized Germany resting on a blend of classical Roman law and the usus modernus as it had developed in Germany. Roman classical private law, built upon the free interactions of equal, independent property-owners and untouched by the feudalistic and ecclesiastical accretions of the Middle Ages, especially appealed to the German lawyers for its republican virtue, as well as its qualities of juristic elegance and orderly classification. The jurists' classical legal project, argues Whitman, was joined to the Kantian idealism and romantic nationalism of the German intelligentsia, who were intent on redefining their nation and culture in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. Their problem was two-fold: to reconcile a modern capitalist economy and society with the ideal of the organic community; and to reconcile liberty with a unified state replacing the mosaic of principalities and kingdoms that still governed Germany.
According to Whitman, all of these romantic dreams were punctured by the political turmoil of the 1840s, the failure of liberalism in 1848, and the rise of authoritarian central power under Prussia. In the wake of Bismarck's top-down revolution, legal liberalism transformed itself into a doctrine of private security and efficiency, of protection of individual interests through the power of the State. Rudolph von Jhering (1818-1892) is portrayed by Whitman as the intellectual leader of this movement; Jhering turns from the idealism and conceptualism in his work of the 1850s to a sceptical realism in the 1860s and on to a forthright utilitarianism in the 1870s and 1880s. 48 Jhering's utilitarian liberalism strongly influences the jurists and bureaucrats who formulate the Bü rgerlichesgesetzbuch (BGB). This great civil code emerges as the constitution for an atomistic market, marked by a privileging of the free will in key areas such as property, inheritance, and contract; and a corresponding lack of engagement with the law of associations which increasingly dominate the economy in an age of industrial labour and capital.
Whitman's ambitious thesis, which links the details of private law doctrine with vast debates on nation-building and social organization in Germany, may give an exaggerated picture of the explicit political and sociological content of lawyers' debates. 49 The political impulse to codification began with a desire to gather up a mass of existing laws in a fissured legal system and weld them into a coherent and unified institutional and procedural scheme, not necessarily to reform the content of the laws in the manner of Enlightenment legislators. 50 The German Romanists' objectives went a further step and involved deep rationalization of the norms of the law as well as its actions and procedures, through the relentless application of the Pandectist method. Yet their labours over the content of laws were structured more often than not by purely legal concerns rather than social concerns or political economy. 51 For one example, the early nineteenth-century Pandectists were committed to ending feudal subordination through the conversion of peasant-holdings to free ownership on the pattern of Roman dominium, with lords' rights converted to iure in 48 R. von Jhering, Die Kampf um's Recht (Vienna, 1872), a runaway bestseller going into many editions and translations, including The Battle for Right (P. A. Ashworth (trans.), London, 1883) and The Struggle for Law (J. L. Lalor (trans.), Chicago, 1879); R. von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End (I. Husik (trans.), New York, 1914; 1st edn., Zweck im Recht, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1877-83,); C. J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (2nd edn., Chicago, 1963), 154-8. 49 F. Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference to Germany, (T. Weir (trans.), Oxford, 1995, from the 2nd revised edn., Gö ttingen, 1967), at 279-386. Wieacker's history remains invaluable, though as Reinhard Zimmerman notes (ibid., Foreword, at xii), Wieacker studies juristic thought rather than the evolution of core legal doctrines. Noteworthy also are the author's denunciations of the 'legalized injustice of the Nazi regime', with laws as 'the terror tactics of a dictatorship motivated by racial hatred' (ibid., 421-2)-though Wieacker's own close relationship with the regime was hardly unproblematic: see J. Q. Whitman, Review (1999) re aliena, or real claims attached to the peasant's ownership; this was a key part of the jurists' programme to establish a legal order recognizing freelywilling citizens of equal civil status under a unitary state. The elimination of feudalism was thus not designed as a social reform measure, but as a reform of status and jurisdictions. The lawyers engaged at some level with idealist philosophy, romantic political doctrine, and occasionally with utilitarian ethics, but these systems of thought did not drive their professional lives. The most important test case is the great controversy initiated by Savigny and Thibaut from 1814 over the value of codification. This debate was commonly taken to concern grand themes of statecraft. Savigny, with Goethe the most admired German intellectual of his age, asserted that law was the organic emanation of the German community or nation, but this romantic message was confused by his conflicting assertions that professional jurists were the true interpreters of that Volksgeist, and that the state as representative of the Volk was incapable of valuable legal reform through exercise of legislative will. Nonetheless Savigny's romantic positions caught on like wildfire, driven by patriotic rejection of French codified law for the German states. 52 In practice, however, the debate came to turn on whether juristic scholarship, newly renovated by Savigny through his reform of university law schools, should continue its slow process of building legal science, or whether lawyers should strive in the here-andnow to meet the national need for a reformed and coherent legal system. Ultimately, it was Savigny's Pandectist heirs, including Puchta, Windscheid, and Planck, 53 who developed the techniques to carry out the codification programme, harnessing historical legal science to pragmatic lawmaking. Savigny came to be invoked as an authority for the very reform that he deplored.
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The ideology of late nineteenth-century German legalism excluded any notion of policy content in the law. Jhering's interest jurisprudence of the 1870s was a heretical departure from the jurists' conceptualism and arguably had little practical impact. Windscheid argued that the positive jurisprudence of the jurists was superior to direct legislative solutions because it was founded on a scientific knowledge of existing law and was not diverted by ethical, political, or economic considerations. He turned to Roman law above all because of the high technique of the classical jurists; thus Planck wrote of Windscheid's foundational work on codification: '[I]t did not occur to him to wish to derive the contents of legal clauses 52 A brilliant assessment of Savigny's incoherent positions and the social reasons for his commanding influence is given in H. U. Kantorowicz, 'Savigny and the Historical School' (1936) 53 Law Quarterly Review 326, especially at 332-41.
53 Gottlieb Planck (1824 -1910 , a practitioner and professor leading the first and second codification commissions across two decades, and who is described as the 'true intellectual father of the BGB' by Wieacker, History of Private Law, n. 49 above, 372. 54 Wieacker, History of Private Law, n. 49 above, 341-53, 371-9; John, Politics and the Law, n. 22 above, 15-47, 84-7. exclusively or, even predominantly, from Roman law'. 55 Yet Windscheid's jurisprudence was also was married to a highly Kantian conception of the legal privileges of the free willing individual, as he himself wrote:
The law creates for every will an area within which it is dominant and from which alien wills recoil. Law is, in the first place, not a restriction but a recognition of human freedom. The restrictive element is merely the other side of the freedom thus guaranteed.
One can summarize the ideology of the German Romanists in terms of four commitments: to historical and conceptual jurisprudence; to the abstract Kantian ideal of individual freedom and self-realization; to the building of a unified German state as a guarantor of freedom and legal rights; and finally a rejection of the utilitarianism that was a hallmark of English liberalism, and indeed an exclusion of any explicit political economy. 56 Thus Ennerccerus in his study of Savigny of 1879 did not follow Savigny's legal philosophy but gave priority to a positivist conception of law:
[C]onstitutional change has ensured the influence of the people's convictions about the law: but above all it is the new German Empire and its powerful central authority that is the guarantee of a code, which is truly common to the whole of Germany. 57 This belief in a national law cultivated by jurists and promulgated by a strong state was not just a professional ideology. Positivist legalism, in both its historical and conceptual guises, was one of the central components of a wider political liberalism throughout the nineteenth century. The liberals of the 1840s did not agree in their national, social, or economic views, but were united by the political and legal goals of eliminating feudal privileges and princely prerogative, though they did not go so far as to embrace republicanism. They wanted a Rechtsstaat incorporating separation of powers, and some degree of responsible parliamentary government, a liberal constitutional monarchy rather than a participatory democracy. 58 The historian Blackbourn has detected in German liberalism not only a core commitment to legalism, 59 but also 'a widespread admiration for Britain' in the early and middle years of the nineteenth century. Carl Welcker for example described the British state around 1845 as 'the most glorious creation of God and nature and simultaneously humanity's most admirable work of art'. 60 In the next generation, English history of all periods became a special concern of German scholarship. 61 The combination of Romanism and Kantianism of the jurists and their adoption of a strong liberal constitutional ideology formed a new common sense that attracted criticism from both left and right. Leftists had good reason to be disappointed. The jurists' assault on the institutions of feudalism using the weapons of jurisprudence was inconclusive, and it was legislation after 1848 that produced significant reforms to landholding. Social democrats chafed at the technocracy, bureaucracy, and authoritarianism of the emergent national state. The social democrats went along with the codification project, but when the code was finalized the drafters omitted employment law and the law of associations, surrendering these key areas to the states. This opt-out had stark political results: the general theory of free contracting enshrined in the BGB melded with the states' restrictions on collective industrial action to throw the weight of national and state law against the worker, the union, and the political association. By default a seemingly depoliticized private law, which consciously sought to exclude the policy dimensions of public law, was seen to take a strong ideological position against recognition of the legality of collective sectoral interests and against positive state regulation of the economy. Critics accused the codifiers of myopia-that their fixation on the creation of optimal ground rules for the free play of individual wills was unhappily divorced from social and economic reality.
Perhaps more significant was the opposition to the liberal code from the conservative right, and here lay an intellectual shift somewhat at odds with the values of the nineteenth-century jurists. As the nineteenth century progressed the German middle-class, including especially the professoriate, became steadily more nationalistic and statist. Historiography, economics, political science, and sociology in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany became imbued with patriotism and the desire for a strong state to heal the political and economic turmoils buffeting Germany from the 1870s, as population growth, industrialization, and class conflict accelerated. One effect of this mood was increasing hostility to liberal political culture, whether the utilitarianism associated with England or the German idealist tradition; and this illiberalism infiltrated attitudes to economics and law. 62 In this period there emerged the 'Kathedersozialisten', the 'socialists of the chair', led by Gustav von Schmö ller and Werner Sombart . 63 It is worth examining the values of the Kathedersozialisten in order to understand the turbulent intellectual climate within which the BGB was developed.
V
Schmö ller dominated academic economics and economic history in Imperial Germany, and was reputed to decide the bulk of academic appointments within the state-controlled professoriate. 64 He routinely excluded thinkers whose methods or politics were too liberal or socialist for his taste, such as 'Marxists and members of the Manchester School'. 65 In his dense works of institutional description, he studied the roots of contemporary problems in German society and state: his topics included class struggle, mercantilism, and guild and town jurisdictions. His overall themes were that the political institutions of a community were the prime determinants of its economic life; and that social science should be problem-based, and should aim to investigate and solve social problems through policy advice to rulers. According to his precept and example, professors were bureaucratic counsellors owing loyalty to the state that employed them.
Schmö ller accepted the validity of evolutionary stage theories inherited from eighteenth-century social science; his variant models included shifts in the mode of production from pastoralism to agriculture to industry and trade; or systems of exchange moving from barter to monetized trade to credit; or demographic or technological stages of development. But all these stages were simply facets of the 'dependence of the main economic institutions of any period upon the nature of the political . . . bodies most important at the time'.
66 Schmö ller had no belief in the methodological individualism or utilitarianism of English economics:
The idea that economic life has ever been a process mainly dependent on individual action,-an idea based on the impression that it is concerned merely with methods of satisfying individual needs,-is mistaken with regard to all stages of human civilisation.
67
In a rancorous controversy with Carl Menger , the Austrian marginal utility theorist, beginning in 1883-84, Schmö ller completely denied the validity of deductive economics, and he was to preach that the purpose of German political economy was 'to rid the science of Schmö ller also opposed the Kantian idealism of the German humanities, and was more sympathetic to Darwinian, Hegelian, and Marxist approaches to the social sciences. 69 The policy element of Schmö ller's analysis was unstinted praise of central state intervention in the economy by a strong national ruler and skilled bureaucracy standing above sectional interests; and along with this stance went a rejection of deductive systems of economic analysis whether liberal or Marxist, in favour of problembased, inductive, policy-oriented enquiry. 70 Much of his work investigates 66 G. von Schmö ller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance, illustrated chiefly from Prussian History, being a chapter from the Studien ü ber die wirthschaftliche politik Friedrichs des Grossen (1883; W. J. Ashley (trans.), New York, 1896), at 1-2. 67 Mercantile System, n. 66 above, 3-4. By age 22 Schmö ller had clearly formulated his methodological stance: 'If man were compelled only by necessity, we could rightfully call our science [of economics] a mathematical one, and we should only need to seek for the natural laws involved; then we should have an eternally valid theory. But since this is not so, we must place economics among the social sciences, which cannot be separated from space, time and nationality, and whose foundations we must seek, not alone, but primarily in history': (1860) the web of laws and political controls that promoted and regulated markets and production in local economies. In his view, territorial organization of economies eventually had to give way to unified state organization that repressed and integrated partial local interests. His studies encompassed everything from early village organization, to medieval municipalities, corporations, guilds, and provinces, 71 through to the crown and estates of the German principalities and empire. At all times, the important channel or catalyst of social and economic evolution was through developing stages of government.
72 Schmö ller summed up his theory of state integration of economic life in his analysis of mercantilism:
What was at stake was the creation of real political economies as unified organisms, the centre of which should be, not merely a state policy reaching out in all directions, but rather the loving heart-beat of a unified sentiment.
Only he who thus conceives of mercantilism will understand it; in its innermost kernel it is nothing but . . . state making and national-economy making at the same time .., which creates out of the political community an economic community, and so gives it a heightened meaning. The essence of the system lies not in some doctrine of money, or of the balance of trade; not in tariff barriers, protective duties, or navigation laws; but in something far greater:-namely, in the total transformation of society and its organisation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the national state.
73
The resonance of Schmö ller's theory of economic evolution through state formation with the romantic nationalist impulses behind legal unification is not hard to identify. His work also fed those impulses; his 1883 essay on mercantilism helped lay the intellectual foundations for the Bismarckian tariff policy and the later forward naval policy. Certainly the essay on mercantilism ends with a fulmination against the 'egoism' and 'violence' of English naval and mercantile policy that had denied to Germany its rightful overseas trade and colonies.
74 Schmö ller urged the state in its domestic policy to ameliorate poverty, regulate industry, and thus forestall the lure of class war and social democracy with national welfare schemes; and these writings also swayed Bismarck's administra- 71 His reputation was first made with a study of the Strassburg weavers' guilds: Die Strassburger Tucher-und Weberzunft: Urkunden und Darstellung, nebst Regesten und Glossar, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Weberei und des deutschen Gewerberechts vom 13. bis 17. Jahrhundert (Strassburg, 1879) . 72 The staged theory of governance is stated most elaborately in Schmö ller's Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre ('Basis of General Political Economy') 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1900-8) ; see further Veblen, 'Gustav Schmö ller's Economics', n. 69 above.
73 Mercantile System, n. 66 above, 50-1. Schmö ller continued his advocacy of tariffs in the Grundriss, n. 72 above, II, 599 ff.
74 Mercantile System, n. 66 above, 70-80; A. Ascher, 'Professors as Propagandists: The Politics of the Kathedersozialisten', in (1963) tion. 75 Interestingly on the eve of the Great War, Weber attacked Schmö ller's policy-oriented approach to social enquiry as tendentious and lacking curiosity in causality and interpretation, and called for German social science to be more detached and less nationalistic.
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In the next generation the most important economic thinker, apart from Weber himself, was Werner Sombart. He trained as a lawyer as well as an economist, and wrote historical sociology investigating the birth of capitalism from medieval roots and its modern industrial and urban development. 77 Sombart highlighted entrepreneurship as the key sociological element in modern economies, being a state of mind involving quantified rationality, forward thinking well capable of delayed or deferred gratification, love of risk, and a powerful desire for unlimited riches beyond the needs of present consumption. His methodological goal was to introject intentionality into the Marxian sociology of economics-not far distant from Weber's theoretical project. In Sombart's account the classical Smithian model of division of labour and impersonal price competition did not give a sufficient explanation for the rise of capitalism.
78 Like Weber, Sombart gave primacy to cultural and psychological rather than technological or organizational factors in analysing the rise of capitalism. The machine-driven industrial revolution in England, or technological innovation generally, was not the core issue, as technology was only a byproduct of culture.
79 Sombart made a special study of the economic prowess of Europe's and Germany's Jews, whom he located as the 'catalytic' force in capitalist growth in Europe through their provision of commercial services. 80 Again, Sombart's work on entrepreneurial spirit parallels Weber's investigation of both pariah religions and the Protestant ethic as strands in the development of the capitalist mind. Sombart also analysed the cultural and intellectual roots of socialism, 81 Sombart was a brilliant stylist filling his work with barbed aperçus and terse paradox, but it was also rife with intellectual incoherencies and contradictions. 84 Thus his historical study of capitalist rationality sits side by side with a radical dislike of capitalist culture as resting on usury, bargaining, monopolistic property, and commodified labour relations. His early socialist and Marxist adulation of the proletariat and his admiration for the Jewish commercial genius gives way to derision of urban and industrial culture and rank anti-working class and anti-semitic prejudice. His famous pamphlet 'Why is There No Socialism in the United States? ' (1906) answered the posed question in terms of the utilitarian and individualistic mentality of the American worker, in an impersonal urban culture denuded of fellow-feeling. Sombart went on to write diatribes against the English in 1915 as almost the whole German intelligentsia was swept into a strident patriotism during the Great War.
85 Sombart derided the English as a selfcentred nation of 'traders' who must submit to the generous-hearted German nation of 'heroes'. There were distant echoes of these sentiments in Weber, who distinguished 'booty' capitalism run by charismatics, 'pariah' capitalism run by Jews and other religious outsiders, and 'bureaucratic' capitalism run by everyday professionals. Like themes are also Sombart rewrote this book many times as his politics veered rightwards, changing its title in 1903 to Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft in Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, and by its resissue in 1935 it had turned into a Nazi tract.
82 W Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus (Munich, 1913 , repr. New York, 1975 (Oxford, 1999) , at 20-1, notes the irony that Felix Liebermann, the archetypal otherworldly Berlin Jewish professor, whose career was always marked by Anglophilia, ended up writing diatribes in 1916 against liberal and imperial England, in the midst of the slaughters of the Great War: thus Liebermann '[g]ratefully dedicated' the third volume of his critical edition of Anglo-Saxon legal texts 'to the Memory of Heinrich Brunner and Frederic William Maitland, the age's greatest researchers into the legal history of medieval England', and haplessly offered the work as: a token in melancholy memory of the peace-blessed time when this work began, when the German immersed himself admiringly in the political life and literature of Britain, and the Briton ungrudgingly opened the way to German research, including this contribution to the earliest history of his nation; also as a heartfelt expression of the confident hope that the storm of hate and the sea of blood which engulf the time of completion of these pages will soon be understandable as essentially caused by the historical necessity of conflict between the heedless claims of a World-empire, familiar with power, to continue to dominate navigation and world trade, and the justified determination of the unified German people to contend peacefully and circumspectly but with freedom and strength for the goods of the earth, and to expand itself to the measure of its inborn life.
found in Tö nnies with his distinction between the warm connection of precapitalist community and the cold impersonality of modern commercial society. However, Weber and Tö nnies do not turn these ideas into a crude nationalist message. 86 Sombart ended his career as an active supporter of the Nazis; he has been well described as a 'reactionary modernist' akin to the National Socialist ideologues Schmitt and Heidegger. 87 One common feature of the 'socialists of the chair' was their attraction to autocratic and centralizing state rule, and perhaps this helps explain their instrumental attitude to law and legal history. Max Weber is distinguished in that he never departed from a tolerant liberalism, was less extreme in his patriotism and nationalism, though he shared in his contemporaries' cultural pessimism and dislike of the modern age. At any rate Weber never succumbed to Anglophobia like his colleagues during the War. He was fascinated and attracted by the liberal English state and society, even though its lack of coordination and direction puzzled him and challenged his models of law and economy. 88 Another important liberal economic theorist with a training in law was Lujo Brentano (1844 -1931 , who from the 1870s studied the legal and economic history of guilds and trade unions and later summed up his findings in a massive treatise of English social and economic history. 89 Brentano favoured trade union rights, industry regulation, and broad-based welfare policies, and rejected the illiberalism and chauvinism of the statist Kathedersozialisten, opposing state protection of landed and agrarian interests. He also kept his distance from socialism, remaining a left-leaning liberal democrat. 90 His own theorizing of the rise of capitalism was sharply critical of the theological-religious and racialist-religious theories of both Weber and Sombart, and instead emphasized the role of long-distance trade promoted by armed power in the earliest periods, and of impersonal calculative ethos emerging as the communitarian bonds of family, tribe, guild, and locale break down in modern times. 91 Brentano, together with contemporaries such as the distinguished jurist and historian of medieval law Hermann Kantorowicz (1877 Kantorowicz ( -1940 , 92 maintained a liberal spirit in German law, history, and social science in the troubled years between the Great War and the Nazi dictatorship, with Kantorowicz, in particular, bravely championing liberal values and internationalism in the Weimar years.
VI
Did the intellectual environment of the Kathedersozialisten, with its fervid patriotism and its rejection of deductive and rationalizing social science, leave its traces within German legal science and history? It is possible to give both a negative and positive answer. It should be acknowledged that the great German Romanist jurists and legal historians from before the Great War inhabited a technocratic intellectual world from which illiberalism-and indeed any overt political ideology beyond abstract Kantianism -was tacitly excluded. From Puchta and Savigny through (early) Jhering and Windscheid, the Pandectist project involved the construction of a coherent and gapless system of civil law through scientific scrutiny and abstraction of legal-historical (that is, largely Roman) sources. This technique perforce required a degree of rationalism, comparativism, and conceptualism, balancing any tendency to romantic or ethnic national-91 L. Brentano, Der Wirtschaftende Mensch in der Geschichte: Gesammelte Reden und Aufsä tze (Leipzig, 1923 ism. 93 At any rate the Pandectist lawyers of the later nineteenth century, with their strong objective of codification, united to fend off attacks from romantic Germanists such as the folklorist Jacob Grimm (1785-1863), the jurist Georg Beseler (1809-1888), and the legal historians Georg Waitz (1813-86) and Otto Gierke (1841-1921). The Germanists called for a more nativist law sensitive to the social needs of Germany. Their critique of the Pandectists reached its peak in Gierke's attack on the draft Code in 1889.
Gierke's interventions into the politics of codification hovered somewhere between conservative and socialist critiques of free market liberalism. He advocated curbs on land markets and restriction on freedom of testation, favouring Junker and peasant interests. He also wanted restrictions on freedom of contract so that debt and mortgage creditors and landlords could not push their bargaining power to its fullest extent against farmers, tenants, and builders. In his elaborate theory of associational law, he wanted more recognition of the place of collective action by unions and corporations as an intermediate level of economic activity between the state and the market, freed of the unwieldy concessionary system of state control of incorporation. 94 Gierke believed that by tracing the history of German law controlling associations and guilds he could supply the necessary building materials for a well-regulated economy and society, with strong state interventions able to tame the corrosive effect of liberal markets. His work came to epitomize the historical scholarship and juristic creativity of the Germanists in the practical areas of commercial law, company law, agency, land law, inheritance, joint property, and trust.
95
Gierke was only the most prominent figure within a wider Germanist movement in legal historical scholarship of the time. These scholars sought to highlight a great German tradition of feudal law and culture underpinning European, especially Northern European state formation. It would be inaccurate, however, to portray their work as part of the rising tide of romantic nationalism and illiberalism in German legal scholarship of the 93 M. John, 'The Peculiarities of the German State: Bourgeois Law and Society in the Imperial Era ', (1988) pre-war period. Heinrich Brunner (1840 Brunner ( -1915 , for example, wrote of Frankish law spreading through Normandy to England, establishing a strong state under the Crown with the jury as a royal innovation, not an insignia of local liberty. 96 Liebermann's work on the Anglo-Saxon legal sources, 97 Maurer on Teutonic law and the village commune, 98 and Heusler on the law of the Icelandic sagas 99 may have been driven by a similar desire to portray the genetic unity of the North European world of 'Germanic' law. These scholars 'treated as German legal history anything supposedly Germanic anywhere in Romanic Europe . . . stimulated by the spirit of Germanism in Germany, [the view] was that all the non-Roman elements in such legal orders . . . were necessarily German and directly attributable to the historical and social influence of the Germanic tribes'. 100 Germanist sentiments could have a cosmopolitan as well as nationalistic valence. For example Rudolph Gneist (1816-95) , who studied early English constitutional development, gave his work an Anglophile twist: he wrote of decentralized English law and administration as a model that German administrators might well emulate. He saw the key to English constitutionalism in self-government, being the 'balanced constitution' of Crown and Parliament originating in the early fourteenth century, with the English Crown later successfully harnessing the gentry's energies for the voluntaristic provision of government services, reaching a peak of cooperation in the eighteenth century. 101 Although his historical work tended to give support to decentralization of public law powers in the emerging German state, Gneist added his voice to the call for codification of private law, a common law for Germany as a measure for national unity. 102 Brunner too supported the code though he agreed with Gierke that the 1888 draft was lacking in social conscience.
103
The Germanists participated fully in the liberal codification project. They were represented on the second drafting commission by the distinguished legal historian Rudolf Sohm (1841 Sohm ( -1917 . 104 But it is striking how the drafters of the BGB collectively resisted the special interests of Junker, peasant, and artisan groups, who campaigned with little success to include laws protecting unified landholdings and traditional trades from the disintegrating pressures of commerce, speculation, and creditor power. Sohm helped introduce some rather limited social law into the code, but went along with the mainly liberal lines of the Pandectist project; his and the Germanists' reasoning was that the code had to stand above sectional politics or it would fail as a national institution. The Pandectist response to critics such as Gierke, who called for curbs on the implicit market liberalism of their Romanized private law, was to concede the need for interest-based legislation on a piecemeal basis, at national or state level, but to reject the idea that social policies should be allowed to disturb the science of private law. The professionalism of the jurists as both legal scientists and as servants of the state meant that even in the conservative and nationalistic of Wilhelmine Germany, practical law-making could appear to be relatively immunized from ideology and interest-group politics.
105
To summarize: legal and economic ideology in Wilhelmine Germany was deeply historicist and nationalistic, but also informed by a spectrum of political colours, liberal, conservative, and socialist; and scholars could combine more than one of these colours in their work. This pluralism is reflected in the making of the BGB in the 1880s and 1890s. The BGB can be seen as both strikingly modern in content and technique, and yet at the same time anachronistic at its birth. It reproduced the conservative family law and liberal economics of the late nineteenth century; it restated the 102 John, Politics and the Law, n. 22 above, 43, 107. 103 Ibid., 108. 104 Sohm wrote distinguished works on Roman law (e.g. Institutionen des Rö mischen Rechts, Leipzig, 1884), German law (e.g. Die Altdeutsche Reichs-und Gerichtsverfassung, Weimar, 1871), and above all on ecclesiastical law (Kirchenrecht, Leipzig, 1892) . He wrote other synthetic historical works demonstrating the interactions between these systems of law in the making of German legal tradition, and can thus be characterized as a pluralist straddling the German and Roman wings of the historical school. Part of his church history is summarized and translated in W. Lowrie, The Church and its Organization in Primitive and Catholic Times (London, 1904) . Sohm supported codification as early as 1874, neutralizing the use of Savigny as an anti-code authority: John, Politics and the Law, n. 22 above, 47-8. 105 John, Politics and the Law, n. 22 above, 160-240; Wieacker, History of Private Law, n. 49 above, 371-86. dogmas of freedom of contract and absolutism of ownership in uncompromising terms under the shield of a selective reading of Roman sources. There was little sense of the rise of associational form that was already transforming relations amongst commerce, capital, and labour, that area of law where the Germanists made their greatest contribution. The confrontation between liberal legal technocracy and collectivist social and political ideologies in the making of the BGB suggests that the fin-de-siècle German legal world was far from monistic, with rival intellectual traditions sharing the stage. It is this intellectual and political sophistication that helps account for the prestige and influence of German law, history, and other human sciences in France, England, Italy, and America before the Great War. 106 
VII
Academic law was late to develop in England, and lawyers as a group trained within their own professional schools were distanced from other intelligentsias. There were a handful of great figures of the early and middle years of the nineteenth century such as Bentham, Austin, and Stephen, who pursued a systematic and conceptual analysis of law and its relation to society. 107 However the cultivation of an independent juristic science is most strongly evident in the two decades after 1880. 108 The legal historian Maitland stands out amongst the crowded talents of end-ofcentury academic law. 109 Maitland read philosophy and political science under Sidgwick at Cambridge, but turned to history after a fruitless sevenyear stint in chambers at Lincoln's Inn. He was self-taught as an historian, and as an historian soon came to reject overtly Sidgwick's concept of political science as a search for the laws of society. 110 He was openly inspired by German examples, writing of his mixed feelings of gratitude and shame at having scholars of the calibre of Brunner, Liebermann, Gneist, and Riess 111 so completely dominate the positive historiography of early English law. 112 Maitland's developed historical sense also led him to criticize Maine's schematic anthropology of law, both in details and in its architecture. Maitland argued that social, economic, and institutional history revealed no general laws, falsifying Enlightenment 'stages' theories. For example there was no universal progress of family law and kinship structure:
To construct some fated scheme of successive stages which shall comprise every arrangement that may yet be discovered among backward peoples, this is a hopeless task. A not unnatural inference from their backwardness would be that somehow or another they have wandered away from the road along which the more successful races have made their journey. 113 The better model was one of a series of long continuities punctured by breaks precipitating change, with selective imitation between systems hastening variant mutations. Hence it was false for anthropologists to postulate immutable stages of development as a social form of Darwinian evolution, as Maitland expounded:
Even had our anthropologists at their command materials that would justify them in prescribing a normal programme for the human race and in decreeing that every independent portion of mankind must, if it is to move at all, move through one fated series of stages which may be designated as Stage A, Stage B, Stage C and so forth, we still should have to face the fact that the rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas and have thus been enabled, for anything that we can tell, to leap from Stage A to Stage X without passing through any intermediate stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet, or at the Nicene Creed, by traversing a long series of 'stages'; they leapt to the one and to the other.
But in truth we are learning that the attempt to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind is idle and unscientific. For one thing, the number of portions that we can with any plausibility treat as independent is very small. For another, such is the complexity of human affairs and such their interdependence that we can not hope for scientific laws which will formulate a sequence of stages in any one province of man's activity. We can not, for instance, find a law which deals only with political and neglects proprietary arrangements, or a law which deals only with property and neglects religion. So soon as we penetrate below the surface, each of the cases whence we would induce our law begins to look extremely unique, and we shall hesitate long before we fill up the blanks that occur in the history of one nation by institutions and processes that have been observed in some other quarter. If we are in haste to drive the men of every race past all the known 'stages', if we force our reluctant forefathers through agnatic gentes and house-communities and the rest of it, our normal programme for the human race is like to become a grotesque assortment of odds and ends. 114 Maitland's historical inductivism further explains why there is little economic observation in his work despite the intensity of economic learning in his immediate environment. 115 His legal values were rooted in the aesthetic liberal philosophies of Sidgwick and the Cambridge of the Apostles; and such liberalism tended to be pragmatic, undoctrinaire, and wary of system-building social science. 116 This meant that Maitland was not a romantic committed to the historical past for its own sake. His pragmatic and reformist urges can be seen most strongly in his impatience with the messiness of the modern common law; he resented the dead weight of historical doctrine, especially in the land law 117 and in equity, 118 and expressed envious admiration for the rationalizing achievements of the BGB.
119
Maitland's complex and allusive scholarship has suggested to many admirers that he was driven by a simple desire for truthful historical knowledge of England's medieval past through close study of legal records; and this is one explanation for his reverence for the German masters' loving recreation of the legal past as they strove to build the future.
120 But Maitland also responded to the substantive political arguments embedded in the Germans' romantic scholarship, both its liberal and its nationalist and communitarian strains. Here must be distinguished two overlapping parts of Germanic legal-historical theory, the first being the idea of the original Teutonic village commune, deriving from patrilineal kinship groups and holding land in common, as evoked by Maurer and adopted by Maine, and the second being the concept of free associations permeating every level of social organization between the individual and the state, as promoted by Gierke. Maitland adopted the Gierkean concept of associational law as a deeply attractive political model of legal development, and at the same time vehemently rejected the 'village community' thesis, whereby early Germanic collectivism gives way to Romanic individualism in the history of land settlement. Maitland showed that cognatic kinship groups in Anglo-Saxon period with recognition of matrilineal descent and relatively free alienation of property led to cross-cutting loyalties that fostered an early individualism in family life and land-holding, rather than the exclusivity of patriarchal and patrilineal clans. Indeed he went on to reject the very terms of the 'village commune' debate:
[I]s it not very possible that the formula of development should be neither 'from communalism to individualism,' nor yet 'from individualism to communalism,' but 'from the vague to the definite'? It apparently attributes ownership of land to communities. It contrasts communities with individuals. In doing so it seems to hint, and yet be afraid of saying, that land was owned by corporations before it was owned by men. . . . But if we abandon ownership by corporations and place in its stead co-ownership, then we seem to be making an unfortunate use of words if we say that land belonged to communities before it belonged to individuals. Co-ownership is ownership by individuals. 122 Maitland's commitments in the ideologically-charged debate over ancient communitarianism was far from straightforward, as he revealed in a letter of 20 February 1889 to Vinogradoff discussing the manuscript of his Villainage in England. Maitland wrote:
[I]t will seem strange to English readers, this attempt to connect the development of historical study with the course of politics; and it leads you into what will be thought paradoxes-e.g. it so happens that our leading 'village communists', Stubbs and Maine, are men of the most conservative type, while Seebohm, who is to mark conservative reaction, is a thorough liberal . . . [T] he English believer in 'free village communities' would very probably be a conservative . . . On the other hand with us the man who has the most splendid hopes for the masses is very likely to see in the past nothing but the domination of the classes. Of course this is no universal truth-but it comes in as a disturbing element. 123 Maitland's own developed position was neither apolitical (as he implied to Vinogradoff) nor individualistic, 124 but was a subtle form of corporatism. Here Gierke's views on the reality of group personality, the need for a free associative law, and the crucial role of corporations as bodies intermediate between the State and the individual, influenced Maitland's vision of politics and law at the deepest level. 125 His work from the late 1890s highlighted the emergence of groups and associations, some legally defined and others informal, which formed a web of relations stretching from the Crown, itself a corporation sole, through royal franchises and feudal tenures to the plethora of local jurisdictions and associations, including townships and boroughs as well as manors and fees. 126 He made the point that in the era before social contract theory, the lines between land law and government, between corporate law and constitutionalism, and indeed between jurisprudence and political theory, were hazy at best, and he saw here messages for the modern age of the mixed economy with its corporate capitalism and powerful bureaucratic states. 127 In his Ford Lectures of 1897 he summed up his vision with an aphorism at Maine's expense:
If we look at the doings of our law courts, we may feel inclined to reverse a famous judgment and to say that while the individual is the unit of ancient, the corporation is the unit of modern law. 128 Maitland thus can be portrayed as a pluralist, a mildly communitarian liberal, not easily compared to his German role-models who were largely legal nationalists or Kathedersozialisten, adulating the State as representative of the Volk. In his work on the history of the early English state, he offered a profound reappraisal of the positive authority of the Crown, that mystical entity that stands substitute for a state in England. 129 His ideological complexity in regard to the theory of the state can partly be seen as a distillation of the times. With the strains and disappointments of liberal democracy at the fin-de-siècle, many historians were no longer enamoured of the Whig constitutional narrative of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Whig historiography, entrenched by William Stubbs in the 1870s, celebrated the English nation's evolution of liberty from Saxon origins, to be enshrined from the high middle ages in parliamentary government, the common law as popular custom, and a balanced constitution of estates. The ancient constitution, in this narrative, survives the centralizing corruption of the luxurious Stuarts and prospers into sober Victorian government. 130 Maitland in his work on the earliest parliaments put in place of the Whig orthodoxy a more complicated story, with the king's government of the thirteenth century appearing as heavily judicialized in its various guises of councils, courts, and parliament, and more committed to rule through administration and adjudication on the feudal model than any basis in representative government. 131 Maitland was patriotic about the achievements of English constitutionalism, observing how the English common law had come to provide a system of land holdings, legal actions, and constitutional principles in countries spreading from Australia to America. But this imperialism is the victory of legalism, not of AngloSaxon liberty writ large. 132 For work which further teased out the social and economic implications of manorial or feudal law, we can turn to Maitland's contemporaries Frederic Seebohm (1833 -1912 ) and Paul Vinogradoff (1854 -1925 . Vinogradoff studied the operation of jurisdiction and status in the relationships of serfs and lords, and used his historical materials to show that English villeinage was highly regulated by law and custom, blurring the line be-tween free and unfree tenants. Vinogradoff's historical project was overtly designed to contrast freedom-making Western feudalism with the degraded and permanent servility of serfs in the Slavonic lands, where lordship had never been legitimated by restraining law.
133 Seebohm studied the earliest origins of manorialism, which comprised a mixture of demesne, dependent holdings, and common property. He vehemently opposing the Germanist 'village commune' thesis as romantic error; primitive communism was not the basis of feudal collectivism. He traced manorial organization back to the Roman villa, which provided the template for Anglo-Saxon, and indeed most European feudalism, including Frankish and German; non-feudal Celtic 'tribalism' was the exception proving the Roman rule. According to Seebohm, the common property of the manor was in descent from Roman forms of serfdom; it was an equality of dependents, a stage in social evolution to be escaped as freedom brought the individual personal liberty and private rights in land, insulating him and his family from the governmental power of landed superiors. 134 Maitland doubted the thesis that Roman agrarian structure was the source of manorialism, but in engaging with Seebohm he accepted some of his themes: 'May it not again be that such communalism as we find in the ordinary village of later times is in large measure the result of seignorial pressure?'
135 Seebohm also related the efficiency of the agrarian system to late medieval, Tudor, and Georgian enclosures which destroyed the dependent English yeomanry and peasantry, and laid the foundations for a free land market. 136 Maitland, Vinogradoff, and Seebohm were each exceptional in their versatile ability to straddle early legal and economic history. It was more conventional for economic historians in England to focus on modern enclosure and industrialization, rather than the earlier periods favoured by legal 133 P. Vinogradoff, Studies in the Social History of England in the Middle Ages (St. Petersburg, 1887); P. Vinogradoff, Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History (Oxford, 1892); P. Vinogradoff, English Society in the Eleventh Century: Essays in English Medieval History (Oxford, 1908); P. Vinogradoff, The Growth of the Manor (London, 1904 (London, , 2nd edn., 1911 . Vinogradoff remained keenly interested in Russian law and politics; see his trilogy The Russian Problem (London, 1914), Self-Government in Russia (London, 1915) , and The Reconstruction of Russia (London, 1919) . The large Vinogradoff archive at Corpus Christi College, Oxford beckons a new study. historians. 137 The professional discipline of economic history in England can be said to have begun in the nineteenth century with J. E. Thorold Rogers' five-volume history of agriculture and prices from 1866, which provided essential data to ground the new subject.
138 Arnold Toynbee (1852 -1883 in his Oxford lectures of 1881-2 on the industrial revolution provided an interpretative framework, emphasizing not only the productive potential but also the social harms caused by enclosure and the early factory system. Much of this celebrated work comprised an attack on Ricardo and the classical economists' deterministic theories of rent and wages that seemed to justify the impoverishment of the common people in industrial society. Toynbee's blend of historical illustration and impassioned radicalism, which itself drew on deep religious commitment, gave his work an extensive influence, and helped redefine economic history as a rival to economic science, rather than as a partner of legal and constitutional history. 139 The economic historians who followed in Toynbee's wake shared his wish to combat the verities of economic science. Their fire was trained against the heritage of David Ricardo, whose deductive methodology they further ascribed to the leading contemporary economist Alfred Marshall . This brand of economic science was a softer target than the moralistic political economy of Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill. One response by the economic historians to Ricardian and Marshallian logic was to raise large sets of quantitative and qualitative data for inductive analysis, claiming à la Maine that England had to be studied as a society passing through certain stages of development, and that clearing markets did not necessarily provide the key to understanding all periods but that local, time-bound custom had its own rationality. Maine, Stubbs, and later Vinogradoff were invoked as inspirations for the historical method in economics; or as one of the pioneers, Cliffe Leslie, put it, jurisprudence taught history to economics. 140 Another pioneer of the historical approach to economics was William J. Ashley (1860 Ashley ( -1927 at Oxford, who dedicated his English Economic History and Theory of 1885 to Toynbee. 141 He studied feudal tenures, guild structure, and the law merchant, acknowledging Schmö ller as an influence, whom he translated. He later made his career at Toronto and Harvard, teaching constitutional law and history as well as economic history. In a slightly different vein was William Cunningham (1849 -1919 , a Christian socialist and romantic anticapitalist working at Cambridge who wrote on medieval industry, commerce, and guild regulation, and who vehemently rejected Marshall's presumptions that economics was a deductive science holding good for all times and places. 142 After a long polemical battle with Cunningham, Marshall himself introduced historical sections into his treatise and also philosophical reflections on the importance of coordination, cooperation, and law, supplementing the emphasis on price competition as the basis for understanding economic life. 143 The intense methodology debates of this period connected to burning contemporary issues of imperial tariffs, protection of industry, and legal recognition of trade unionism; inductivists tended to favour étatism and collectivism; deductivists tilted to free markets and individualism. Both Ashley and Cunningham strongly supported Imperial tariff preference. Indeed Cunningham spelt out a fullblooded mercantilist position in 1890, in words that could have been written by Schmö ller:
Our national polity is not the direct outcome of our economic conditions; whereas time after time, our industrial life has been directly and permanently affected by political affairs, and politics are more important than economics in English history. 144 In methodology and political outlook these founding fathers of historical economics can fitly be described as English 'socialists of the chair'.
The debates over the veracities of deductive economics and policy implications for regulation continued when Cunningham left Cambridge in 1895 to join like-minded scholars at the new London School of Economics, including E. Cannan (1861 -1935 ), W. S. Hewins (1865 -1931 , R. H. Tawney (1880 -1962 ), and Sydney Webb (1859 -1947 and Beatrice Webb (1858 -1943 . 145 The LSE school tended to argue for an enlarged state role in economic regulation and also railed against Marshallian static equilibrium economics for its lack of interest in institutions and history. The Webbs in their magisterial histories of unionism and local government paid considerable attention to the network of law and jurisdictions governing the lives of the common people through collective and public actions, and their works are still valued for their close research as well as their role in laying the intellectual foundations of the British labour movement. 146 Hewins, the first director of the LSE, published on seventeenthcentury trade and finance in 1892, again emphasizing the beneficial role of the state. 147 Tawney's work was perhaps the most brilliant and innovative. His work on Tudor agrarian history and enclosure examined the waning years of the manorial economy, and included a degree of analysis of shifting legal forms of tenure and regulation of trade and guilds. 148 Tawney's celebrated essay 'The Rise of the Gentry' argued that shifts of wealth from the aristocracy and church to the gentry had altered the composition of the ruling class and thus disturbed the balance of economic and political power in Tudor and Stuart England, and that this imbalance had been a prime cause of the English Revolution. 149 In the background to this enquiry was the problem of the relationship of religion and ideology on one hand and economics on the other. These concerns were addressed more squarely in Tawney's famous lectures 'Religion and the Rise of Capitalism', which examined the shifting economic ideology of theologians and the church; his theme was to show how capitalistic ideas seeped into Christian thought, which had conventionally been opposed to the personal accumulation of wealth.
150 Though Tawney's theme would seem to be highly Weberian, his preparatory notes suggest that he was uninfluenced by Weber's famous 1905 essay on Puritanism and the capitalist ethos, and that his analysis of the links between religion and economics was independently conceived. 151 Tawney's ideas dominated the social and economic historiography of Tudor and Stuart England ('Tawney's Century'), giving rise to raging argument over the nature of the landholding class and the economic implications of Protestant religion and dissent in early modern England, debates that ran for two generations and touched deeply on English political identities. 152 Tawney's work methods were influential too, blending detailed intellectual, institutional, and quantitative history with guiding hypotheses. In his documentary publications he made extensive use of writs, lease documents, indentures, and other deeds as well as case law and statute to explore England's earlier economic history. Later he researched into canon law and the law of tenures, but there was no particular place in his work given to legal or constitutional factors in explaining long-term historical change.
Tawney, together with the charismatic medievalist Eileen Power (1889 Power ( -1940 , founded the Economic History Society in 1926, with its own conferences and prestigious review journal, in conscious opposition to the liberal economic science of Marshall and then of Keynes at Cambridge. It is notable that despite the conscious embrace of institutionalist methodology, it is the case that very few of the articles in the first series of the Economic History Review, from 1927 to 1948, showed any interest in law or legal history. 153 The legal historian W. S. Holdsworth (1871 Holdsworth ( -1944 , in the first issue of the Review of 1927, called on economic historians to take legal ideas and doctrines seriously, calling for collaborative research in areas such as labour regulation, monopolies, and land tenures. 154 His plea met with a meagre response. Medievalists could not help but to use legal records extensively in exploring manorialism, but of later periods there were some five articles on companies and one on combination in the entire first series of the Review. 155 Of this handful, only D. O. Wagner's work on Edward Coke's economic ideology really engaged with the details of law.
156 Perhaps Tawney's success and influence as a role model for economic and social historians helped establish the rift between legal and economic history that opened still wider later in the century. For one example, Eileen Power's brilliant comparative study of European manorialism published in 1932 harnessed the Germanist theories of legal association in her investigation of the everyday life of the peasantry, but she also decried the tendency of legal historians to focus on the manorial relations of lord and peasant and attempt to generalize about the institutions and jurisprudence of feudalism; this was to ignore the relationships of the common people within their specific village communities. 157 At Oxford in the pre-war years, important work on economic and legal history was carried out in the Law Faculty. Aside from Vinogradoff we can name here the constitutional jurist Albert Venn Dicey (1835 Dicey ( -1922 . His masterpiece Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century, published in 1905 and expanded in 1914, can be seen as a key work of legal and economic history, joining laissez faire ideology and criticism of collectivism with history of legislation and government, with some attention given to courts and juristic writing as well. 158 If Dicey upheld the power of a unified state with sovereign legislative power, he also used the values of the Rechtsstaat to counsel against the use of state power to regulate society and economy; in his hands the Rule-of-law state becomes the Nightwatchman state. 159 At Cambridge in the period before the Great War, John Clapham (1873 built up his dominance of economic history teaching and research, and after writing histories of the English woollen industry and a comparative economic history of modern France and Germany, was appointed to a chair in 1928. 160 Like Ashley, he was by no means hostile to Marshallian neoclassical assumptions about the working of the economy, and the first volume of his great multi-volume work The Economic History of Modern Britain of 1926 was dedicated to both Marshall and Cunningham. Clapham did, however, harbour a dislike of pure economic theory, and in 1922 he published a stinging attack on the 'empty economic boxes' or theoretical constructs of orthodox price theory. 161 His work was densely descriptive and did not use models of deductive methods, but he did accept much of the normative framework of orthodox economics with its emphases on entrepreneurs increasing productivity and setting market prices for goods in a laissez faire regulatory framework. Clapham's work describes legislative policies closely and made good use of parliamentary legal enquiries and of published legal treatises; but he was otherwise little interested in legal institutions.
162
The historical assault on political economy had waned by the inter-war period; economists and economic historians practised their arts in relatively happy intellectual seclusion from each other. In the 1920s and 1930s Keynes was occasionally interested in the history of regulation, prices, and industrial organization; 163 but his great work on macro-stabilization pulled Cambridge economics back towards deductive science; and a similar story could be told of John Hicks' Oxford in the 1930s and 1940s. 164 There were some counter-streams to neo-classical method at this time, such as Maurice Dobb (1900 Dobb ( -1976 and the nascent school of English Marxist economic historians. 165 These scholars were occasionally interested in the doctrinal content and operation of law, as Rodney Hilton (1916 Hilton ( -2002 sought to analyse the basis for lordly jurisdiction and power over tenants; 166 and Christopher Hill (1912-2003) and E. P. Thompson (1924 Thompson ( -1993 examined seventeenth and eighteenth century legal ideology and linked this to the rise of agrarian and industrial capitalism. 167 But these are marginal cases; the striking overall impression is how seldom economic historians and legal historians cooperated in England from the turn of the century to the Second World War, and even less thereafter. It may be that German-style historical jurisprudence with its interest in community and nation, including its English variants in the work of Maine, Maitland, and Vinogradoff, was fundamentally tainted by association with German totalitarianism in the 1930s and 1940s; Savigny and Jhering were now seen as illiberal precursors of Carl Schmitt. 168 At any rate, when Patrick Atiyah formulated his grand synthesis of legal, intellectual, and economic history in 1979, he truly had no recent English models to build upon, and the result was an extremely valuable but highly eclectic study of inductively related themes. 169 It is interesting to speculate how Atiyah might have written Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract today; perhaps with efficiency models drawn from Coase and modern law and economics?
VIII
The heroic age of French law was the eighteenth century, when the Commentator tradition was completed so as to lay the foundations for the great Napoleonic Code. 170 In the nineteenth century, jurists were less sure of their vocation beyond professional application of the Code, and tended to copy the German historical masters, claiming Savigny as a distant Frenchman. 171 The heyday of deductive social science in France also lies in this period, in the era of the Enlightenment, with many foundations of economic theory being laid down by French thinkers including Borda, Condillac, Condorcet, Laplace, Quesnay, Du Pont de Nemours, Say, and Turgot. 172 It is fair to say that the brilliant Enlightenment tradition of economic sciences did not prosper in France, but migrated across the Channel and the Atlantic to help lay the foundations for English and American political economy. By 1900, French economics, such as it was, nestled within the law faculties, and although there were some competent synthesisers and teachers such as Dunoyer and Pirou, the latter an erudite lawyer-economist, the discipline was not at a peak. 173 By contrast with law and economics, the disciplines of history, sociology, anthropology, and geography boasted a host of brilliant figures, many of whom closely studied issues of economic development. Some of this originality may have derived from the eccentric nature of this sub-intelligentsia, many of them distanced from Parisian academic life and its orthodoxies (Belgians, Alsatians, and Jews are notable here). The legal sociology of Emile Durkheim (1858 Durkheim ( -1917 drew from his exposure to Roman and civil law. In his well-known theory, law is seen as a strong indicator of the underlying structure of society, culture, and economy. It followed that a heightened division of labour and increasingly atomistic social structure and anomic values under advanced capitalism causes shifts in legal form from 'retributive' norm enforcement to 'restitutory' sanctions. Even under anomic or amoral modern capitalism, according to Durkheim, legallysupported contractual exchange represents a cooperation based on shared beliefs and goals rather than a competitive struggle between individuals for gain. 174 Durkheim's brilliant sociological successors after the Great War were Maurice Halbwachs (1877 Halbwachs ( -1945 , 175 and above all his nephew Marcel Mauss (1872 Mauss ( -1950 , the progenitor of cultural anthropology based on the analysis of gifting or discretionary exchange as a bonding force of society. 176 Although the Durkheimian schools of legal sociology and anthropology made brilliant surmises about the functions of law in society, they were not very specific about the interactions and evolution of law and economy over time; and the empirical basis of Durkheim's premises were challengeable. It could be said that industrial society has a more retributive criminal law than primitive society; that the division of labour is as much coercive and alienating as cooperative and integrating; that law is a professional praxis, not a mirror of social structure. 177 As in England, perhaps the greatest work done in legal and economic history emanated from the medievalists, and here we can observe the pervasive influences of Fustel de Coulanges (1830 -1889 and Henri Pirenne as brilliant teachers, writers, and mentors. Fustel de Coulanges wrote on religious, legal, and civic bases of the ancient city cultures, which he saw as the seed of modern European societies. Towards the end of his life he made explicit his criticisms of the romantic Germanist attempts to portray a primitive agrarian communism in land preceding feudal and private tenures. 178 Pirenne analysed the nature of medieval European trade, and its role in fomenting the urban culture in Northern Europe. He also studied the collapse of the culture of late antiquity, and the impact of Islamic military incursions in promoting the rise of feudalism involving the subordination of farmers to military lords. 179 If the grand theses of these scholars are no longer followed, the expansive comparative methodology proved to be inspirational. They directly influenced Marc Bloch (1886 Bloch ( -1944 and the early Annales school of history led by Bloch together with Lucien Febvre. Bloch's work encompassed a wide field including the nature of kingship in medieval French and English culture; the law of lordship and of manorial organization, the legal and social status of the free and unfree, medieval household composition, and the use of law and custom to coordinate rural production and to coerce labour. Bloch was also a wide-ranging comparativist, and his work of the 1930s can be seen as a liberal-minded protest against the darkening world of aggressive nationalisms that finally claimed his life. Bloch rejected sociological determinism and grand theory, but rather sought out patterns of social and economic organization over very long periods, examining the interrelations between law, politics, literature, agrarian practice, military organization, religion, kinship, demography, technology, trade, prices, currency stability, and more. Bloch's masterpiece Feudal Society shows the author's ability to integrate sophisticated legal history with his over-riding concern to analyse the entirety of material and economic life. 180 His chapters on the foundations of law in medieval Europe investigates the interplay of custom, canon law, royal law, and Roman law; and he returns constantly to the long-term social results of the differing shades of servitude and freedom and the nature of lordship and vassalage in the various national jurisdictions. 181 The originality of England, in Bloch's view, was to evolve a centralized royal system of justice sharply distinguished from local jurisdictions, that could regulate the manorial economy without (like the French crown) dictating to society at all levels: 'In this way English feudalism has something of the value of an object-lesson in social organization.' 182 Annales historians following Bloch perhaps lacked his striking capacity to weave together so many perspectives convincingly; and the late Annales school presided over by Braudel became more narrowly Francocentric and methodologically static. 183 Bloch by contrast ranged confidently across European history, and he attended closely to English history and affairs. He was professionally close to his English peers, visiting London and Oxbridge on many occasions, and was a distinguished contributor to the Cambridge Economic History. His continuing influence on modern historical thought is comparable to Maitland's, showing how rigorous historical enquiry can be made across a broad canvas of legal, social, and economic history.
Apart from Bloch's oeuvre, and outside the new school of economic history he invented, there were fine French students of English economic history such as Paul Mantoux (1877 Mantoux ( -1956 ) who gave a classic account of the industrial revolution in 1906. 184 Mantoux used a conventional descriptive methodology, and was interested in law chiefly in terms of ad hoc legislation interventions concerning enclosures, poor relief, trade union rights, the apprenticeship system, child labour, monopoly, patent, trade, and price controls. É lie Halévy (1870 Halévy ( -1937 at the same time wrote about the English 'philosophical radicals', in which class he included liberals, utilitarians, and classical economists, 185 as well as producing a six-volume general history of Victorian England. This work again demonstrates interest in English history as an important reference point for European scholars grappling with the experience of modernity in their own societies.
IX
We have seen how it was in the close study of feudal society that legal and economic history were likeliest to meet, and here Russian scholars were deeply influential. 186 The work of Vinogradoff on the legal and economic framework of villeinage has been discussed; 187 he inspired other Russian scholars before the Great War and the Revolution, including M. Kovalesky, D. Petrushevsky, and A. Savine. This school was concerned to study the nature of the English village community and compare it to the Russian mir, and thus explore the evolutionary path of agrarian institutions. 188 The great classicist M. I. Rostovsteff (1870 Rostovsteff ( -1952 looked to more distant history; his seminal work on the Mediterranean economy and society of antiquity drew from every source including legal materials.
A key figure of the next generation was M. M. Postan (1899 Postan ( -1981 , who trained in law and economics at Odessa and Kiev after studying science and sociology at St Petersburg. This protean intellectual dazzled students and colleagues and succeeded Clapham as the dominant figure of the discipline of economic history. After working at the LSE, he moved to Cambridge in the 1930s. 190 There he pushed medieval economic history into new directions, shattering the Pirenne thesis that expanding urbanbased trade across Northern Europe had brought capitalist relations to the rural countryside and had hastened the dissolution of feudal ties and the shift to urban industrialism. Postan was adept with every type of source, and used legal documents skillfully with a deep knowledge of European legal concepts. He showed that access to profitable trades in agricultural produce could lead lords to intensify feudal subordination of the peasantry, in order to expand demesne production for the market. 191 This insight appealed to Marxists and other anti-capitalists, who could show the rise of market relations to be coercive rather than liberating for labour.
192 But Postan's thesis was rather demographic in nature-he argued that it was population shifts, induced by long historical rhythms of over-population, famine, and plague, that determined the relative power of lords and peasants. His studies of the legal status of the medieval labourer fed his wider demographic theories and showed how fruitfully medieval legal records could be used in economic history. 193 The rival Marxist interpretation of medieval economic history, given in outline by Maurice Dobb, 194 was given empirical grounding by the Russian scholar E. A. Kosminsky and even relax the Coasean insistence on crystalline, tradeable property rights as the essential economic and legal virtue. Beyond Weber and Coase there are further problems to solve, such as how the variant modernizations of European societies were shaped by the linked developments of Germanic law, Roman law, and Anglo-Norman common law; and how legal traditions swayed the path of state formation within national systems, including non-European states that adopted and adapted European legal codes. It is important to study the evolution of legal rule-making and economic calculation; but the terrain of legal and economic history extends far beyond that. 
